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Children's Rights Under the Burger Court: Concern for
the Child But Deference to Authority
"Children have a very special place in life which law should
reflect." 1 Yet, despite this realization by Justice Frankfurter, the
United States Supreme Court's attempt to define this "very special
place" has posed two traditions in conflict. The family tradition,
rooted in the common law, dictates that parents have primary re-
sponsibility for the care and custody of their children. 2 As a coun-
tervailing concern, the egalitarian movement has sensitized the
public to the tragedies of child abuse and neglect. 3 This awareness
has led many to classify children as a disadvantaged minority strug-
gling for constitutional recognition. 4 The result has been a cry in
the courts and the legislatures to increase children's rights. 5 The
Burger Court has had to reconcile these two conflicting positions-
family versus civil rights-in a number of different contexts involv-
ing the rights of children.
This note explores the Burger Court's impact on the constitu-
tional rights of children. Part I emphasizes that the United States
Constitution protects children. Part I accomplishes this by outlin-
ing six areas in which the Burger Court has been cognizant of the
interests of children. Part II examines how the Burger Court has
resolved situations where the interests of the child clash with the
interests of the state. Next, Part III analyzes those decisions where
the Burger Court has had to resolve its most difficult analytical con-
1 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2 See notes 113-15 infra and accompanying text.
3 Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Aban-
doning Youth to Their Rights, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 630-32.
4 Id. at 631.
5 Id. at 631-32. The article cites several examples of this position. See, e.g., R. FARSON,
BIRTHRIGHTS (1974):
[A]sking what is good for children is beside the point. We will grant children
rights for the same reasons we grant rights to adults, not because we are sure that
children will then become better people, but more for ideological reasons, because
we believe that expanding freedom as a way of life is worthwhile in itself. . . . If
all this sounds too open and free, we must recognize that in this society. . . we are
not likely to err in the direction of too much freedom.
Id. at 31, 153. See also Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343 (1972)
("[T]he arguments for and against perpetuation of [minority] status have a familiar ring. In
good measure they are the same arguments that were advanced over the issues of slavery
and the emancipation of married women."); Wald, Making Sense Out of the Rights of Youth, 4
HuM. RTs. 13, 15 (1974) ("The child's subjugated status was rooted in the same benevolent
despotism that kings, husbands, and slave masters claimed as their moral right."); cf. In re
Snyder, 85 Wash. 2d 182, 532 P.2d 278 (1975) (15-year-old girl who was antagonistic to-
ward her parents asked ajuvenile court to declare her incorrigible and place her in a foster
home; the court complied with the request.).
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flict: situations where the interests of the child clash with the inter-
ests of the parent. This note concludes that while the Burger Court
has recognized that children have legitimate interests, the Court
nonetheless has shown an increased willingness to defer to either
parental or state authority at the expense of advancing children's
rights.
I. The Child as an Individual
The Burger Court has noted that "[m]inors, as well as adults,
are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional
rights." 6 The Burger Court, however, has also stated that the con-
stitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of
adults. 7 As Justice Powell suggested in Bellotti v. Baird, the peculiar
vulnerability of the child is one reason for this inequality. 8
Over its tenure, the Burger Court has demonstrated its sensi-
tivity to the vulnerability of the child in many contexts. The Burger
Court has reflected this sensitivity in considering the interests of
children in the areas of juvenile justice, school desegregation,
school discipline, custodial relations, pornography, and voluntary
commitment. This section discusses these areas as examples of the
Burger Court's cognizance of the constitutional plight of the child.
In the area ofjuvenile justice, the Burger Court has been sensi-
tive to the unique position of the child.9 The juvenile court struc-
ture is distinct from the adult criminal justice system and the
Supreme Court has held that juvenile offenders may constitution-
ally be treated differently than adults. 10 In In re Winship, the Burger
6 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); Breed v. Jones,
421 U.S. 519 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
7 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
8 Id.
9 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519
(1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
10 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. at 533. This separate treatment is justified by
the idea that the juvenile court is not geared toward a crime and punishment philosophy.
Rather, its theoretical goal is treatment and rehabilitation; its procedures are clinical, not
punitive. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967). See also Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice:
Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 142-51 (1984). The article cites
various interpretations of the development of the juvenile justice system. See generally J.
INVERARITY, P. LAUDERDALE & B. FELD, LAW AND SOCIETY: SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
CRIMINAL LAw (1983); A. PLATr, THE CHILDSAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d
ed. 1977); D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNA-
TIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980); E. RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'SJUVE-
NILE COURT EXPERIMENT (1978); S. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT:
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF "PROGRESSIVE" JUVENILE JUSTICE 1825-1920 (1977); JUVE-
NILEJUSTICE: THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY AND CURRENT REFORMS (L. Empey ed. 1979); Fox,
Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); Mack, TheJuve-
nile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909).
ChiefJustice Burger has stated:
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Court recognized that institutional confinement deprives the child
of family and friends and subjects the child to the stigma of being a
"law-breaker."" Thus, the Court held that the Constitution re-
quired proof beyond a reasonable doubt during the adjudicatory
stage when the child is charged with an act that would constitute a
crime if committed by an adult.' 2 In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the
Burger Court again considered the degree of constitutional protec-
tion owed juvenile offenders' 3 in holding that a trial by jury is not
required in the adjudication phase of a state juvenile court delin-
quency proceeding.' 4 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court,
stated that compelling a jury trial would "remake the juvenile pro-
ceeding into a fully adversary process and [would] put an effective
end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal
protective proceeding.'' 5
In the school desegregation area, the Burger Court has been
particularly aware of the tangible effects of segregation on chil-
dren. 16 In Milliken v. Bradley H, Chief Justice Burger recognized
that one of the consequences of segregated schools is that children
are educationally and culturally set apart from the larger commu-
nity.' 7 These children inevitably acquire habits of speech, conduct,
and attitude that reflect their cultural isolation-habits which will
inadequately serve them in the larger community.' 8 Thus, the Mil-
liken Court approved a desegregation remedy that authorized state-
paid remedial education programs for children in the Detroit public
schools.' 9 According to the Court, this special training was a neces-
sary component of the "compensatory education to be provided
Negro students who have long been disadvantaged by the inequi-
The original concept of the juvenile court system was to provide a benevolent and
less formal means than criminal courts could provide for dealing with the special
and often sensitive problems of youthful offenders. . . . [This] compassionate
treatment [is] intended to mitigate the rigors and trauma of exposing youthful
offenders to a traditional criminal court ...
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 376 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
11 397 U.S. at 367.
12 Id. at 368.
13 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
14 Id. at 545.
15 Id. In dissent, Justice Douglas argued that providing a jury trial will leave the child
feeling that he has been treated fairly. This, according to Justice Douglas, will make him a
better prospect for rehabilitation. Id. at 562 (citing Judge DeCiantis of the Family Court of
Providence, Rhode Igland in In the Matter of McCloud, decided Jan. 15, 1971). Although
disagreeing on the method, both sides in McKeiver saw a need to protect the child in the
juvenile court setting. The juvenile justice decisions will be discussed more thoroughly in
Part II of the note.
16 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S.
1 (1971).
17 433 U.S. 267, 287 (1977).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 290.
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ties and discrimination inherent in the dual school system." 20
In two school discipline cases, the Burger Court has explored
the parameters of children's due process rights. In Goss v. Lopez21
and Ingraham v. Wright,22 the Court again recognized the unique po-
sition of the child in the school setting. In Goss, the Court held that
a student must be given notice and an informal hearing before he
could be suspended from school. 23 The Court believed that a stu-
dent has a cognizable liberty interest in avoiding unfair and mis-
taken exclusion from school.24 In addition, the Court noted that
charges of misconduct could seriously damage the child's reputa-
tion in the community and therefore affect his future education and
employment opportunities. 25 The informal hearing, according to
the Court, would provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous ac-
tion and its consequences. 26
Unlike Goss, in Ingraham the Court held that due process did
not require advance procedural safeguards before a school could
administer corporal punishment to a child.27 The Court recognized
that a child has a liberty interest in procedural safeguards that
could minimize the risk of wrongful punishment.28 The Court,
however, believed that due to the low incidence of abuse in ad-
ministering corporal punishment and the availability of established
state judicial remedies in the actual event of abuse, no further con-
stitutional protections were necessary for the child.29
The Burger Court addressed the area of custodial relations in
Santosky v. Kramer.a0 In Santosky, the Court held that clear and con-
vincing evidence of neglect is required before the state can termi-
20 Id. at 284 (citing Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817, 831
(1969)). Notably, in Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 29 (1971), another school deseg-
regation case, the Court further expressed its concern for children by noting countervailing
factors that may be involved in a desegregation remedy. Although it authorized bus trans-
portation as a remedy, the Court recognized that busing may have adverse impacts on chil-
dren depending on how the bus routes are chosen, where the children are picked up, and
how much time is spent on the bus. ChiefJustice Burger, writing for the Court, stated that
"[a]n objection to transportation of students may have validity when the time or distance of
travel is so great as to either risk the health of the children or significantly impinge on the
education process." Id. at 30-31.
21 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
22 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
23 419 U.S. at 581 (1975).
24 Id. at 579.
25 Id. at 575.
26 Id. at 583.
27 430 U.S. at 682 (1977).
28 Id. at 676.
29 Id. at 677-78. Furthermore, the Court noted that the subsequent criminal and civil
proceedings afforded substantially greater protection to the child than the informal confer-
ence mandated in Goss. Id. at 678 n.45; see notes 104-10 infra and accompanying text.
30 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
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nate the rights of parents in their natural children.3 1 Although
primarily concerned with the impact of the decision on the parents,
the Court recognized that terminating the rights of parents can also
have dramatic effects upon the life of the child.32 In particular, the
child loses the opportunity for support and maintenance, the right
to inherit, and all other benefits inherent in the parent-child rela-
tionship.33 Because the private interests affected are severe and
irreversible, the Court held that heightened procedural protections
are constitutionally required before a parent's right to the compan-
ionship, care, custody, and management of his child can be
severed.
34
New York v. Ferber illustrates the Burger Court's desire to pro-
tect children from sexual exploitation.3 5 In Ferber, the Court held
that the New York legislature could, consistent with the first
amendment, prohibit the dissemination of visual material which
portrayed children engaged in sexual conduct, regardless of
whether the material is obscene.3 6 The Court based its decision
upon the inherent dangers of child pornography. The Court noted
both that the demand for child pornography gives adults an eco-
nomic motive to exploit and abuse children 37 and that the distribu-
tion of child pornography is proportional to this exploitation and
abuse.38 Therefore, the Court held that the infringement on first
amendment rights is offset by the state's compelling interest in
prosecuting those who sexually exploit children. 39
Finally, the Court has been cognizant of the interests of chil-
dren when parents decide to voluntarily commit them to a mental
institution. In Parham v. J.R.40 , the Court stated that the child has a
protectible liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for
medical treatment and in not being labeled erroneously by the
community as mentally ill.4 1
These six areas illustrate the Burger Court's recognition that
children merit some degree of constitutional protection. The
Court has been particularly sensitive to the impact of its decisions
on the life of the minor. Whether this sensitivity has contributed to
31 Id. at 769.
32 Id. at 760 n.1.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 761.
35 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
36 Id. at 764.
37 Id. at 761.
38 Id. at 759.
39 Id. at 757.
40 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
41 Id. at 601.
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the actual level of constitutional protection given to the child is the
focus of the next section.
II. Child Versus State
By the end of the 1960's the Warren Court had established that
children have the right to equal protection of the law,42 to certain
procedural due process in a juvenile justice setting,43 and to free-
dom of speech.44 But while the Supreme Court had established
these constitutional rights, the Court also had adhered to the prin-
ciple that the state has somewhat broader authority to regulate the
activity of a child than the conduct of a similarly situated adult.
First enunciated in the Prince v. Massachusetts decision,45 this princi-
ple has been affirmed by both the Warren 46 and Burger Courts. 47
In Bellotti v. Baird,48 Justice Powell noted that the peculiar vulnera-
bility of the child and also the inability of the child to make critical
decisions in an informed, mature manner accounts for the Court's
less-than-equal treatment of children, as compared to adults.49
"[D]uring the formative years of childhood and adolescence, mi-
nors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recog-
nize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them." 50
Because of this lesser capacity for mature, affirmative decisionmak-
ing, the Court has long recognized that the state has somewhat
broader authority to regulate the activity of children than of
adults. 5 1
Because the state has a somewhat freer hand in dealing with
children, situations often arise where the interests of the child and
the interests of the state clash. 52 The Burger Court has confronted
42 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
44 Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); West Virginia Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
45 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
46 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
47 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
48 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
49 Id. at 637 n.15.
50 Id. at 635.
51 Id. at 635-36.
52 The child's relationship with the state has been twofold. First, it is clear that in some
contexts the state plays a parens patriae role and protects the child from the harmful acts of
others. In particular, pre-Burger decisions have recognized that the state will protect the
child from parental neglect, abuse, and abandonment if the parents' conduct falls below
minimum standards. In rescuing the child from parental default, the state provides the
custody to which the child is entitled. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967); Bennett,
Rights and Interests of Parent, Child, Family and State: A Critique of Development of the Law in Recent
Supreme Court Cases and in the North Carolina Juvenile Code, 4 CAPBELL L. REV. 85, 97-99
(1981); Shears, Legal Problems Peculiar to Children's Courts, 48 A.B.A.J. 719, 720 (1962) ("The
basic right of ajuvenile is not to liberty but to custody. He has the right to have someone
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this question most often in determining the scope of procedural
due process owed to children in both the criminal and civil con-
texts.53 While the Burger Court has provided children with a mini-
mal level of due process in both contexts, the Court has shown an
increased willingness to defer to the authority of the state to control
and develop the child.
A. Criminal Context
In the juvenile justice context, Supreme Court decisions prior
to the Burger Court have given the child some procedural protec-
tions against the state. In Gallegos v. Colorado54 and Haley v. Ohio, 5
the Court established that minors are entitled to constitutional pro-
tection against coerced confessions. In In re Gault,56 the Warren
Court laid the basic procedural foundation for a state juvenile adju-
dication of delinquency. Recognizing that a juvenile would lose his
liberty and be confined to an institution if adjudged delinquent, the
Court stated that it would not tolerate unbridled discretion, how-
ever benevolent, in substitution for principle and procedure in the
juvenile justice forum.57 Accordingly, the Court held that due pro-
cess requires that a minor be given adequate written notice of the
issues, the right to be represented by counsel, the right to confront
his accusers, and the right to cross-examine witnesses.58
The Burger Court has only slightly modified the Warren
take care of him, and if his parents do not afford him this custodial privilege, the law must
do so.").
The Burger Court has maintained this special relationship. In Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 769 (1982), the Court held that clear and convincing evidence of permanent ne-
glect was required before a state could terminate, over parental objection, the rights of
parents in their natural children. Justice Blackmun stated that this higher standard of proof
was consistent with the state's parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the wel-
fare of the child. "The State's interest in finding the child an alternative permanent home
arises only when it is clear that the natural parent cannot or will not provide a normal family
home for the child." Id. at 767. Thus, the state shares the parent's interest in accurate and
just fact-finding.
The second aspect of the child-state relationship occurs when the interests of the child
and the interests of the state clash. The issue in this situation is how much protection
children should be given.
53 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651 (1977); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975);
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
54 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
55 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
56 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
57 Id. at 18. Gault determined that, to an extent, the informality, flexibility, and
nonadversarial character of the juvenile procedure was inconsistent with due process. See
Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice: A Conceptual Framework for Assessing Constitutional
Rights of Youthful Offenders, 35 VAND. L. REv. 791, 823-28 (1982).
58 387 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1967). The minor must also be afforded the privilege against self-
incrimination. Id. at 55.
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Court's legacy in the juvenile justice area. In the early 1970's, the
liberal strength of the Court contributed to one decision that ad-
vanced children's rights. 59 After this, however, the decisions have
consistently deferred to the authority of the state.60 Thus, the over-
all effect of the Burger Court's decisions has been to advance chil-
dren's rights only minimally.
In the Burger Court's only decision expanding children's
rights, In re Winship,61 the Court held that if a child is charged with
an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult, proof beyond
a reasonable doubt is required to find the child guilty of the act.6
2
The Court rejected the New York Family Court Act's preponder-
ance standard.63 The majority, which included Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Douglas, recognized the strong liberty interests of
the child in avoiding erroneous confinement and the stigma of be-
ing labeled a delinquent. 64 Based on these interests, the majority
concluded that the same considerations that demand extreme cau-
tion in fact-finding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the
innocent child.65 Chief Justice Burger, then in the minority, dis-
agreed.66 Arguing that the juvenile court system "provide[s] a be-
nevolent and less formal means than criminal courts could provide
for dealing with the special and often sensitive problems of youth-
ful offenders," 67 ChiefJustice Burger stated that it was not progress
to transform juvenile courts into criminal courts. 68 Rather, the ju-
venile court's program of compassionate treatment is "intended to
mitigate the rigors and trauma of exposing youthful offenders to a
traditional criminal court" 69 and should not be "strait-jacketed" by
mandating additional procedural protections for the child.
70
59 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
60 See NewJersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985); Breed v.Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975);
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
61 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
62 Id. at 368.
63 Id. at 367-68.
64 Id. at 367.
65 Id. at 365.
66 Id. at 375.
67 Id. at 376.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. Nevertheless, in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427-28 (1979), ChiefJustice
Burger equated criminal trials and delinquency proceedings by distinguishing them both
from involuntary commitment proceedings, which require only clear and convincing
evidence:
The Court [in Winship] saw no controlling difference in loss of liberty and stigma
between a conviction for an adult and a delinquency adjudication for a juvenile.
Winship recognized that the basic issue-whether the individual in fact committed a
criminal act-was the same in both proceedings. There being no meaningful dis-
tinctions between the two proceedings, we required the state to prove the juve-
nile's act and intent beyond a reasonable doubt .... Unlike the delinquency
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The Chief Justice's philosophy found new support in McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania.7 1 In a plurality opinion, the Court held that a jury
trial is not constitutionally required in the adjudicative phase of a
state juvenile court delinquency proceeding. 72 Justice Blackmum,
writing for Chief Justice Burger's new majority, reasoned that the
jury is not a necessary component of accurate fact-finding. 73 In ad-
dition, Justice Blackmun feared that compelling a jury trial would
"remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and
[would] put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect
of an intimate, informal protective proceeding." 74
Later, in Breed v. Jones,75 the Burger Court unanimously held
that the prohibition against double jeopardy applies to children. 76
Although this decision also favored the child in the same way as
Winship, the Chief Justice was still concerned about the decision's
impact on the flexibility and informality of the juvenile court pro-
ceeding.77 He reemphasized his belief that the nonadversarial char-
acter of juvenile hearings promotes the cooperation which is "the
hallmark of the juvenile justice system."78
In contrast to the Court's emphasis upon protecting the child
by adding flexibility to the juvenile justice system, the Burger
Court's deference to state authority colored its decision in New
Jersey v. T. L. .79 In T. L. 0., the Court considered whether the fourth
amendment protects children against school searches.80 Although
the Court held that schoolchildren have legitimate expectations of
proceedings in Winship, a civil commitment proceeding can in no sense be equated to a criminal
prosecution.
Id. (emphasis added).
71 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
72 Id. at 545, 553.
73 Id. at 543.
74 Id. at 545. Justice White, in a separate concurrence, remarked that the differences
between a criminal and juvenile court justified the decision that ajury is not required in the
latter. Id. at 553. In other cases, the Court has held that the confidentiality of juvenile
proceedings must, in some circumstances, give way to other important interests. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979) (freedom of the press in pub-
lishing lawfully obtained information prevails over the state's interest in protecting theju-
venile's privacy); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974) (the defendant's right of
confrontation in a criminal case prevails over the state's interest in preserving the confiden-
tiality of a juvenile's record).
75 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
76 Id. at 541. The Court concluded that, with respect to the risks associated with
double jeopardy, "we can find no persuasive distinction in that regard between the Uuve-
nile] proceeding. . . and a criminal prosecution, each of which is designed to 'vindicate
[the] very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws.' " Id. at 531 (quoting United States
v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion)).
77 421 U.S. at 535.
78 Id. at 540.
79 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
80 Id. at 739.
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privacy, it also recognized the school's equally legitimate need to
maintain an environment in which learning can take place."1 Ac-
cording to the Court, these competing interests required some eas-
ing of the restrictions normally applicable to searches by public
authorities.8 2 In particular, the Court removed the warrant require-
ment and waived the probable cause threshold when students are
involved.8 3 The result is that the child's fourth amendment rights
are significantly eroded by the Supreme Court's willingness to favor
the school's authority to discipline the child.
84
The Burger Court's treatment of the child in the ambit ofjuve-
nile justice indicates that while some of the constitutional require-
ments attendant upon a state criminal trial have equal application
to the adjudicative portions of a state juvenile proceeding,8 5 not all
constitutional rights are to be enforced in the juvenile justice con-
text.86 This limitation results from the Burger Court's belief that
the state may adjust its legal system when dealing with children.
8 7
Essentially, the Burger Court has given the state a "right" to reha-
bilitate the child in an informal setting."" Thus, the Court defers to
the state's parens patriae authority to correct the errant impulses of
a delinquent when the parents fail to keep the child "above the
law."8 9 The Court feels it can accomplish this goal by preserving
the informality and flexibility of the juvenile justice system. 90 Deci-
sions like McKeiver and T.L.0. illustrate, however, that this defer-
ence often costs the child constitutional rights.
B. Civil Context
The Burger Court has recognized that children have liberty
and property interests.91 These interests include a child's interest
in his reputation and standing in the community, 92 his interest in
avoiding physical punishment, 93 and his interest in future educa-
81 Id. at 743.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 759 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 533 (1971).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 533-34 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 30 (1967)). See also Breed v.Jones, 421 U.S. 519,535 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 375 (1970) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
88 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 743 (1985); Breed v.Jones, 421 U.S. 519,
535 (1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 375-76 (1970) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
89 See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
90 See notes 74, 77, 83 supra and accompanying text.
91 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
92 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-75 (1975).
93 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977).
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tional and employment opportunities. 94 Despite this recognition,
the Court has given children only a minimal level of due process to
protect these interests in the civil context. While the Constitution's
language unconditionally grants due process individuals, 95 the
Court has made it clear that it will confer upon children protective
rights against the state only after balancing the child's interests
against the state's interests.
This balancing approach has been resolved in favor of the child
on one occasion. The result, however, only minimally advanced
children's procedural due process rights. In Goss v. Lopez,96 the
Court held that an informal hearing was constitutionally required
prior to a school suspension in order that a student may have an
opportunity to explain his conduct.97 In reaching this result, the
Court balanced the student's interest in avoiding unfair, mistaken
exclusion from school against the state's interest in dealing with the
matter efficiently and without disruption.98 The Court resolved the
balance by requiring an informal procedure.99 This "informal give
and take" still affords the state wide latitude in dealing with the
child.'00 Notably, the four dissenting Justices argued that the
child's interests were not sufficiently important to require an infor-
mal proceeding. 10' Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist felt that schools need broad discretionary
authority to maintain discipline and good order.'0 2 In their opin-
ion, providing due process in "routine" disciplinary problems
would interfere with the daily functioning of schools, thus actually
disserving the student in the long run. 0 3
While the child won the balancing test in Goss, the child lost in
later Burger Court decisions as the four-person Goss dissent-
joined by Justice Stewart-gained majority status. 10 4 In Ingraham v.
Wright, the Court ruled against giving Florida schoolchildren addi-
tional procedural safeguards before inflicting disciplinary corporal
94 Goss, 419 U.S. at 575. The Court also held that based upon the state constitution,
Ohio schoolchildren had a right to a public education. 419 U.S. at 567.
95 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law. ) (emphasis added).
96 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
97 Id. at 584. The Ohio public high school students were suspended for periods not
longer than 10 days. Id. at 568.
98 Id. at 579-80.
99 Id. at 584.
100 Id. at 583.
101 Id. at 595.
102 Id. at 589-90.
103 Id. at 591-94.
104 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651 (1977).
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punishment. 10 5 In Ingraham, the Florida statutory scheme allowed
corporal punishment for disciplinary reasons;106 nevertheless, if the
punishment was excessive, the student could sue under a common
law cause of action for monetary or criminal penalties. 10 7 The
Court felt that this scheme adequately protected the child against
unjust corporal punishment. 08 Accordingly, the majority was con-
cerned with the impact of granting children additional rights
against the authority of the state. 10 9 They believed that the time
costs, diversion of attention from normal school pursuits, and the
extra personnel required to implement mandatory procedural safe-
guards would outweigh the "incremental benefits" of additional
procedural protections. 10
Ingraham thus provides some indication of the Burger Court's
future course regarding children's due process rights in the civil
context. After initially recognizing that children have certain lib-
erty or property interests, the Court will likely defer to the authority
that can best protect the child's interests in the civil context: the
state."' Granting the child additional procedural safeguards would
105 430 U.S. at 683.
106 Id. at 676-77.
107 Id. at 678.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 680.
110 Id. Justices Brennan and Marshall, who advocated the advance in due process for
children in Goss, joined Justices Stevens and White in dissent:
There is, in short, no basis in logic or authority for the majority's suggestion that
an action to recover damages for excessive corporal punishment affords substan-
tially greater protection to the child than the informal conference mandated by
Goss. The majority purports to follow the settled principle that what process is due
depends on the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the protected] interest...
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; it
recognizes, as did Goss, the risk of error in the school disciplinary process and
concedes that "the child has a strong interest in procedural safeguards that mini-
mize the risk of wrongful punishment .... " but it somehow concludes that this
risk is adequately reduced by a damages remedy that never has been recognized by
a Florida court, that leaves unprotected the innocent student punished by mistake,
and that allows the state to punish first and hear the student's version of events
later. I cannot agree.
Id. at 699-700 (White, J., dissenting).
Although not a due process decision, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. 733 (1985), is an-
other example of the balancing approach the Burger Court has used when children's rights
are involved. In T.LO., the Court, per Justice White, held that the search of a student is
justified where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the student has violated
either the law or the rules of the school. The Court balanced the schoolchildren's legiti-
mate expectations of privacy against the school's equally legitimate need to maintain a suit-
able learning environment. After referring to the interests of the child, the balance was
struck in favor of the state by easing some of the restrictions which normally apply to
searches by public authorities. The Court felt that any other standard "would unduly inter-
fere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the
schools." Id. at 743. Again, Justices Brennan and Marshall were in the minority.
111 The Burger Court has also vested the child with a right of privacy which the state
1985] NOTES 1225
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
interfere with the broad discretionary authority the state needs to
maintain discipline and good order.112
III. Child Versus Parent
With respect to children's rights, the Burger Court has had sig-
nificant analytical difficulty resolving the clash between the interests
of children and the interests of parents. The Burger Court has not
consistently resolved this conflict in favor of either. For example,
while the Burger Court has deferred to the traditional authority of
the parent regarding voluntary decisions to commit a child for
mental treatment, the Court has shifted the right of guardianship in
the abortion context from the parent to a position of shared parent-
state power. As a result of this inconsistency, children's rights have
been only minimally advanced.
A. The Traditional Framework
The traditional view, long recognized by the Supreme Court, is
that "the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.""13 In Wis-
consin v. Yoder,"14 the Burger Court embraced this principle by not-
ing that "[t]he history and culture of Western civilization reflect a
strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing
of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbring-
ing of their children is now established beyond debate as an endur-
ing American tradition."1 1 5 Contrary to this traditional view,
cannot take away. In Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977), the Court
voided a New York law preventing distribution of contraceptives to persons under 16. Jus-
tice Brennan stated that the right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting procrea-
tion extends to minors as well as adults. Id. at 693. Similarly, in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976), the Court held that mandatory parental consent as a
precondition for a minor obtaining an abortion is unconstitutional. However, to impinge
upon that right, the Burger Court has only required the state to show a significant-not
compelling-interest. Id. at 75. See also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693
(1977). Justice Powell feels that this lesser scrutiny is appropriate for two reasons. First,
the state has traditionally had great latitude in regulating the conduct of the child. Sec-
ondly, the right of privacy implicates important decisions which minors are less capable of
making. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. Again, the Burger Court has given the child some rights,
but has vested the state with broad discretionary power to regulate. Part III analyzes this
deference to authority.
112 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 745 (1985); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 680 (1977).
113 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). See also Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 621 (1979) (Stewart, J., concurring); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452-53; G.
FIELD, THE LEGAL RELATIONS OF INFANTS 63-80 (1888); 2J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMER-
ICAN LAW *203-06; J. SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 335-53
(3d ed. 1882).
114 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
115 Id. at 232. In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-39 (1979), the Court recognized
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however, the Court has warned that if parents fail to give their chil-
dren the necessary care, support, and attention, the state may exer-
cise its parens patriae power to intervene or even deprive the
parents of all further authority over the children. 116 As Chief Jus-
tice Burger stated in Yoder, a state may restrict a parent's control "if
it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety
of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens."'1
17
The Burger Court has addressed these conflicting principles in the
areas of voluntary commitment and abortion.
B. Voluntary Commitment: Deferring to the Parent
The Burger Court upheld the traditional parenting role in
Parham v.J.R. 18 In Parham, the Court considered whether due pro-
cess requires a preconfinement hearing when parents voluntarily
seek institutional mental health care for their children." t9 In this
setting, the child's interest in remaining free of institutional com-
mitment clashes with the parent's interest in seeking help and gui-
dance for the child. To resolve this conflict, the Court held that
notwithstanding the child's liberty interest, parents retain a substan-
tial if not dominant role in the commitment decision, absent a finding
that parents have an important "guiding role" to play in the upbringing of their children.
In Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 621 (1979),Justice Stewart remarked: "For centuries it has
been a canon of the common law that parents speak for their minor children. So deeply
imbedded in our traditions is this principle of law that the Constitution itself may compel a
state to respect it."
In addition to this common law canon that vests primary responsibility for the upbring-
ing of children in the parents, Justice Powell suggested in Bellotti that a line of cases devel-
oped a constitutional right in the parent against undue, adverse interference by the state.
443 U.S. 622, 639 n.18 (1979). The cases cited to support this proposition are as follows:
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); see also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842-44 (1977); Carey
v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 708 (1977) (opinion of Powell,J.); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); cf. Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 602 (1979).
This supposed right is based upon the presumption that "natural bonds of affection
lead parents to act in the best interest of their children." Parham, 442 U.S. at 602. This
presumption, however, is rebuttable. If the parent does not provide the requisite degree of
care, support, and attention to the children, the parent can be stripped of his or her author-
ity over the child. See notes 116-17 infra and accompanying text; cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745 (1982); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
116 See Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-
34 (1972).
117 406 U.S. at 234. ChiefJustice Burger maintained the same conviction in Parham v.
J.R.. "[W]e have recognized that a state is not without constitutional control over parental
discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized."
442 U.S. at 603 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
118 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
119 Id. at 587.
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of neglect or abuse. 120 The Court presumed that parents possess
what the child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judg-
ment. 12 1 In addition, the majority believed that natural affection
leads parents to act in the child's best interests.' 22 The Court, how-
ever, made one accommodation. To protect the child's liberty in-
terest in not being erroneously confined, the Burger Court
required that a neutral factfinder 123 determine whether the mini-
mum statutory requirements for commitment have been met. 124
This, in the Chief Justice's opinion, would give the child adequate
protection without unduly trenching on traditional parental
authority.125
Therefore, in Parham, the Burger Court substantially affirmed
the common law notion of parental authority. Assuming an ab-
sence of neglect or abuse, the Court only limited the common law
notion by the neutral factfinder requirement. 26 Thus, when the in-
terests of the parent and child clash, Parham positioned the child's
interest as subservient to traditional parental authority. "The fact
that a child may balk at hospitalization . . . does not diminish the
parent's authority to decide what is best for the child."' 27
C. Abortion: The Child is Given a Choice
When considering abortion, the Burger Court has not upheld
the traditional rights of the parent. Rather, in balancing the par-
ent's interests against those of the child, the Court has given the
child a significant right against her parents: the right to go to the
state for counseling and assistance in obtaining an abortion. Thus,
by allowing the child to decide to whom she will turn for advice-
the parent or the state-the Court has vested children with a "right
of choice."' 28
The case law supporting this investiture began with the Court's
1975 decision in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth.'29 In Danforth, the
Burger Court struck down Missouri's abortion statute as unconsti-
tutional. The Court based its decision, in part, upon Missouri's pa-
rental consent provision which required a minor woman to receive
the written consent of a parent before an abortion unless a physi-
120 Id. at 604.
121 Id. at 602.
122 Id.
123 The neutral factfinder does not have to be ajudicial or administrative officer. Id. at
607.
124 Id. at 606-07.
125 Id. at 606.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 604.
128 See Hafen, supra note 3, at 644-58.
129 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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cian certified that the abortion was necessary to preserve the life of
the mother.130 The Court believed that the state had no significant
interest in conditioning an abortion on the consent of a parent.13'
The Court went further in Bellotti v. Baird13 2 where it struck down a
similar Massachusetts abortion statute which required parental con-
sent before a minor could obtain an abortion.133 Justice Powell,
writing for a plurality of the Court, argued that if the state imposes
a parental consent requirement as a condition to an unwed minor's
abortion, the state must also provide an alternate procedure for ob-
taining authorization.13 4 TheJustices believed that the minor is en-
tided to show to a court either 1) that she is sufficiently mature and
well informed to make her abortion decision in consultation with
her physician, independent of her parents' interests, or 2) that the
desired abortion would be in her best interest. 3 5 Accordingly, Bel-
lotti gave the minor the right to go directly to the state, through the
courts, without consulting or notifying her parents. 36
These two decisions indicate that the Court has shifted the
right of guardianship in the abortion context from the parent to a
position of shared parent-state power. The traditional view would
demand that the abortion decision be made strictly in the family
context.'37 In Bellotti, four Justices would allow the state to assume
control over the child without any showing of default, abuse, or
negligence.' 3 8 This constitutes an expansion of the state's parens
patriae role, traditionally reserved for cases in which the parent's
degree of care falls below a minimum level. 3 9
The Burger Court has interjected the government into the
family context, with the attendant risk of polarizing parents and
children, because it believes that in some circumstances the state is
a better guardian of the child.140 Professor Robert A. Burt explains
the trend in terms of a "power" theory. 14 1 Burt feels that the only
authority that commands constitutional respect from the conserva-
tive justices is authority which is backed by sufficient force to prom-
130 Id. at 74.
131 Id. at 75.
132 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
133 Id. at 651-52.
134 Id. at 651.
135 Id. at 643-44.
136 Id. at 647.
137 See notes 113-15 supra and accompanying text.
138 See Bennett, Rights and Interests of Parent, Child, Family, and State: A Critique of Develop-
ment of the Law in Recent Supreme Court Cases and in the North Carolina Juvenile Code, 4 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 85, 88 (1981).
139 See notes 116-17 supra and accompanying text.
140 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
141 Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 329, 322-45.
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ise effective control over a child's disruptive impulses. t 42 Parental
authority only occasionally employs such force.1 4 3 Thus, a specific
authoritarian style of parenting-not the status of being a parent-
warrants constitutional deference. t44 Viewed in the Bellotti context,
Burt would suggest that no honor is due parents who have failed to
keep their daughter from becoming pregnant. Therefore, since the
parents do not warrant constitutional deference, the burden falls on
the state to correct the disruptive impulses of the child. The
Court's response in Bellotti suppressed parent-child conflict by
favoring that force of authority promising effective control over the
development of the child.
The result has been, in theory, to advance the child's rights
against her parents. By giving the child a new right of choice, the
authority of the parent to control and nurture the child has been
limited. Notably, this runs counter to the trend established in
Parham which stressed the authority of the parent.1 45 In reality,
however, the child has no more rights against society as a whole
than she had prior to Bellotti. In the end, the child still cannot act
on her own; she merely can choose to whom she will talk. If she
goes to her parents, they must consent before an abortion can be
performed. If she decides to go to the state, the courts must deter-
mine either that she is mature enough to make the decision or that
the abortion will be in her best interest.
In attempting to resolve the inconsistency in the area of par-
ent-child conflict, the Burger Court retreated from Bellotti in H.L. v.
Matheson.14 6 In Matheson, the Court upheld a statute requiring a
physician to notify the parents of a minor upon whom an abortion
is to be performed. 47 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the major-
ity, stated that abortion is a grave decision which a girl of tender
years, under emotional stress, may be ill equipped to make without
142 Id. at 328.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 340. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Burger stated:
To be sure, the power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may
be subject to limitation. . . if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the
health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens. But
in this case, the Amish have introduced persuasive evidence undermining the ar-
guments the State has advanced to support its claims in terms of the welfare of the
child and society as a whole. The record strongly indicates that accommodating
the religious objections of the Amish [parents] . . . will not impair the physical or
mental health of the child, or result in an inability to be self-supporting or to dis-
charge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way materially
detract from the welfare of society.
Id. at 233-34.
145 Parham, 442 U.S. at 604.
146 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
147 Id. at 413.
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mature support. 148 Thus, unlike his stance in Bellotti, the ChiefJus-
tice here argued that parents have an important guiding role to play
in the upbringing of their children, and this guiding role presump-
tively includes counseling them on important decisions. 149 The
Court thus held that the statute serves the important considerations
of preserving family integrity and protecting adolescents. 15 0 There-
fore, the Court has seemingly abandoned its position in Bellotti in
favor of the more traditional deference to parental authority.
D. The Result
The Burger Court has wavered in its attempts to settle the con-
flicts between parents and children. In Parham, it deferred to the
traditional notion of parental authority, limiting it slightly to ac-
commodate minimally the interests of the child.15 ' In Bellotti, how-
ever, four Justices favored giving the child a significant right of
choice unprecedented in the family context.' 52 As a result, the Bur-
ger Court has advanced the right of minor females in the abortion
context by allowing them to seek state assistance. Yet by recogniz-
ing the guiding role of parents in Matheson, the Court may be sig-
naling that it will return to the traditional Parham approach.
IV. Conclusion
The Burger Court has affirmed that minors are protected by
the Constitution. It has also been cognizant in its dicta of the
child's interests. It has not, however, transferred this recognition
into tangible gains in children's rights. Where the child's interests
clash with the interests of the state, the Burger Court has provided
the child with a minimum level of due process in both the criminal
and civil contexts. In later decisions, however, the Court has shown
an increasing tendency to defer to the authority of the state. This,
in the Court's opinion, will enable the state to rehabilitate the child
in the criminal context or maintain discipline and order in the civil
context. When the child's interests clash with those of the parent,
the Court will defer to parental authority only to the extent that
parents maintain control over the child's errant impulses. If they
do not, the Court will defer to the state to control the child.
Thus, the Court has not significantly increased children's
rights. It has merely decided who can best control or protect the
child: the parent or the state. Given the increasingly conservative
148 Id. at 410 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1979)).
149 Id.
150 Id. at 441.
151 Parham, 442 U.S. at 606.
152 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44.
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tone of the decisions in the area of children's rights, the Court will
likely continue to defer to the authority that can promise the best
development of the child. While the concerns of the child will be
recognized, the Court, in the end, will defer to the authority of
either the parent or the state.
John D. Goetz
